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I wanted to thank Professor Markus Gabriel for the energy and 
passion he displays in his philosophical work. Many of the ideas 
presented herein grew out of Summer Schools, seminars, personal 
conversation, and direct confrontation with his growing body of work. 
Consider this thesis my last attempt to develop a few philosophical 
theses, the originality of which I can’t accept credit. In fact, the ‘non-
existence of the world’ thesis I first encountered in the work of French 
Philosopher Alain Badiou. However, the first time the idea came alive 
for me and bit me in my butthole was after my encounter with Markus 
Gabriel in the Summer of 2012. While my philosophical career ended 
perhaps before it began, I dedicate these thoughts to Professor 
Gabriel. A Professor of Philosophy, indeed, but a Philosopher first 




The world exhibits unprecedented complexity. Things are changing faster than our 
ability to comprehend them. Many believe our time to be a transition from a 
simpler and stabile time to a future when equilibrium will be completely beyond 
our grasp. Drowning in waves of information and bludgeoned by images and 
sounds of digital media, many people have lost a sense of orientation and its 
attendant teleology, longing for security and stability. Such disorientation has 
yielded newer and improved accounts of the prevalence of ‘the death of God’.  
 Stability and security, however, are deceptive. For they are but momentary 
eddies in an incessantly complex and turbulent flux. Today’s world of complexity 
is as irreducible as it is inescapable. While the moment of complexity doubtless 
fosters confusion and vertigo, today’s socio-political, economic, and cultural 
transformations nonetheless create newer and improved possibilities to explore and 
ascertain the nature of our present. If all philosophy, as Hegel says, is a ‘philosophy 
of its time’, then it is our duty as scavengers of the present, to apprehend 
complexity. In order to apprehend complexity, we must ascertain precisely what 
makes this moment different from its predecessors.  
 It’s not simply that our moment of complexity is any different than its 
predecessors. Rather, what is unique about our time is the rate of acceleration at 
which things change. Everything moves faster and faster to the extent that speed 
itself has emerged as the virtue of contemporary life. As Marx said, ‘all that is solid 
seems to melt away’, creating a sense of disorientation, championed by some as the 
conclusion of false-consciousness and lamented by others as the onset of 
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debilitating nihilism. For many, confusion and uncertainty yield a need for 
simplicity that fosters a futile longing for a return to ‘basic values’ or a ‘return to 
nature’. In today’s world, however, simplicity has morphed into an idle and 
idolatrous dream incapable of realization.   
 What role does philosophy play in such a world? Perhaps: What role can 
philosophy play? Philosophy, it is often thought, trades in simplicities. The modus 
operandi of most philosophy proceeds in accordance with a principle of 
reductionism. Underneath the parade of phenomena and the surface-level flutter of 
activity reigns a simple ‘One’, whether a fundamental level of reality or a 
metaphysical unity. The spectrum of reductionism holds no philosophical bias, for 
analytic and continental thinkers alike take reductionism to its absurd ends. 
Whether reducing the common-sense world to aggregates of sub-atomic particles 
governed by the laws of nature and probability or reducing the sensuous world of 
everyday objects to correlates of thought, both reduce one domain to the logic of 
another.  
 The philosophy that will emerge in the pages below flies in the face of common 
sense. In fact, one could argue that the conclusion borders on insane. Philosophers 
are often on the offensive against ‘the mob’, pace Berkeley. From Diogenes, Plato, 
Copernicus, Darwin, Freud, up to and including Alan Turing, radical thinkers have 
pushed thought to its limits exposing and unfurling the extent to which our default 
setting as humans thrown into a world is wrought to the core in deception and 
illusion.  
 This thesis will be no different, I admit. For, in the pages that follow, ‘the 
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world’, that unified, all-encompassing domain about which we speak and make 
apparent discoveries every day will be declared another mythology. Merely another 
illusion. Instead, reality will look radically different. Reality comprises distortive, 
aesthetic simulations. The reality that will emerge will be a computational reality, a 
metaphysical pluralism in which actuality and possibility vie and vex, ultimately 
‘collapsing’ into unified information states. Every state, every relation, every 
simulation creates a new world, one that’s never before existed. Despite the simple 
laws constitutive of any space, the mutual compatibility of different information 
states yields a creative, aesthetic world each moment of which reads like an original 
screenplay. This is a philosophy of the transfinite; more negatively, an anti-Kantian, 
anti-monistic philosophy. I seek nothing less than a new prism through which to 
view traditional philosophical problems and, in the best-case scenario, create 
possible solutions. If anything, I will have risked tarrying on the tangent of the real.  
 
Philosophical Hacking  
Philosophy is ultimately concerned with problems and the concepts we create to 
venture solutions. In fact, if one seeks to glimpse the variety constitutive of the 
philosophical enterprise corner any philosopher and ask, ‘Hey. What’s your 
problem?’ Hidden in this simple question will emerge a complexity worthy of the 
most beautiful fractal. Committing to philosophy means accepting an adventure the 
outcome of which has no transcendental assurances. Thus, the philosopher as 
conceptual adventurer lacks the assurance that her problems are well founded, 
risking the possibility that the problems emerge merely as a property of our current 
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state of knowledge. Moreover, the problems we venture to proffer as solutions —or 
dissolutions— never achieve the pristine clarity of precision known in the exact 
sciences. Philosophy trades in open-ended questions and answers, a dance that 
pivots around this call-and-response structure. It invites a dialogue intrinsically 
plural, suggestions for revisions, and proposals for further improvement or 
completely new alternatives.  
 It is important to stress immediately that in what follows, The Reader will 
encounter countless excursions into various scientific and mathematical theories 
and concepts. These excursions should not be regarded as my attempt to construct a 
scientific or mathematical theory. I understand by ‘scientific theory’ an explanation 
of a well-defined range of natural phenomena, based on systematic observation and 
formulated in terms of a set of consistent but approximate concepts and principles. 
A mathematical theory, on the contrary, like complexity theory, is a mathematical 
theory, one not based on observable physical data. Applied mathematicians and 
experimental physicists, of course, can and do integrate the mathematical tools for 
their scientific theories to explain, say, nonlinear natural phenomena like self-
regulating living systems. I’m operating within the domain of a philosophical 
theory. Most of the arguments offered below aren’t based on a voluminous set of 
observations of physical systems. A philosophical theory, like Sellars claimed, 
concerns how things, in the most general sense, hang-together, in the most general 
sense. 
 Philosophy is conceptual hacking. ‘Hacking’ is often understood as a technical 
skill possessed only by those high-level computer engineers whose software and 
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computer know-how facilitates a relationship with the internal logic of computer 
software; that is, provide any piece of software to a computer hacker, and she’ll 
find not only the internal state-of-affairs but, more importantly, the inherent 
possibilities lying dormant therein. For example, give a hacker a pair of glasses. 
The ‘normal’ mind sees a technology for vision correction. However, a hacker sees 
not only a technology for vision correction but sees possibilities galore. The 
question isn’t merely what is this/what does this do; it is also, and more 
emphatically, what can I make this do? What possibilities are inherent to these 
objects and its relations? Thus, hackers gave us Google Glass and Oculus Rift. 
Hacking, then, should be understood more generally as any attempt to infiltrate a 
particular domain and, first, exhibit its internal structure of current state-of-affairs, 
that is, all that domain’s facts. But, second, and this is the creative, constructionist 
venture, the hacker must find those virtual possibilities lying dormant in that 
particular domain’s state-of-affairs. The proper tools of the philosopher —the 
philosopher’s technology— are concepts. Thus, conceptual hacking comprises the 
philosophical investigation into a particular concept 
(‘Knowledge’, ‘Reality’, ‘God’, ‘World’, etc.) and the determination and exhibition 
of how that concept is understood and employed. The positive, creative aspect of 
conceptual hacking consists in the construction of solutions or dissolutions that 
attempt to render that concept coherent within a larger, more general Weltbild.  
 Hacking is ultimately concerned with abstraction and abstractions. While most 
flee in the face of abstraction, the hacker welcomes, even seeks its intrusion. 
Hackers produce new concepts, new perceptions, new sensations, all hacked of out 
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raw data: they are abstracters of new worlds. One might venture to designate the 
task of hacking as double: preventing the existence of ‘the world’ by debugging the 
inherent contradictions within any theory of everything and, subsequently, putting 
its intellectual and conceptual firepower in the service of creating new worlds.  
 This task promotes the hacker to a cultural position of fundamental importance. 
Computer hackers, to be sure, have received the most attention in virtue of 
domestic surveillance programs and the heroic efforts of Edward Snowden, Julian 
Assange, and Chelsea Manning. However, the original hackers had little to 
anything to do with computers. Instead, ‘phone freaks’ were the original hackers. 
Phone freaks sought to disrupt and short-circuit the communication and phone 
systems of AT&T and Bell. The point was to short-circuit the telecommunications 
world by finding inherent loopholes, gaps, and glitches.  
 Difference is a property of the creative genius of any hacking community. To 
hack is to differ. It refuses representation. Its motivating concern, rather, is not the 
representational User Interface (UI) but the underlying code and machinery that 
serve as the UI’s enabling condition. Thinkers tinker, and the fruit of a hacker’s 
labor is the alteration of representational worlds. Concerned with the abstract, by 
implication, hacking is concerned with the virtual. For in virtue of abstraction the 
virtual is identified, produced and released. I belabor these points because the 
hacker or the Philosopher’s relation to Being will become evident below. Suffice it 
to say that those rebellious, unhygienic tinkerers and thinkers tarry on the tangent of 
chaos.  
 Part One will explore the notion of a discrete reality. It will be necessary, of 
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course, to get clear on some terminology. I see this as the main task of this first 
part. Part Two applies the ideas in Part One to David Foster Wallace’s masterpiece 
Infinite Jest. This allows us to understand more clearly the central axiom of any 





Get with the Program 
 
During the twentieth century, the emergence of information theory and laws of 
thermodynamics generated a communications transformation whose waves covered 
every aspect of the world. The academy will never be the same; the economy will 
never be the same; the everyday will never be the same; this we owe to the digital 
revolution. Today’s dominant media comprise pixels with billions of bits the 
increase of which exponentially grows more and more complex. Today’s natural 
scientists, working at the edge of thought and experiment, at energies and velocities 
never before imagined, interact not with macroscopic objects but, rather, with 
abstract data. A scientist didn’t collect her data; rather, a supercomputer whose 
computational power is extraordinary. The simple task of driving a car doesn’t 
allow escape from our digital reality. Applying pressure to the peddle no longer 
manually activates the firing of pistons; instead, applying pressure to the peddle 
activates computer software that interprets the amount of pressure and sends a 
signal to the engine with the appropriate acceleration information. Software is 
everywhere. The historical record of technological revolution exhibits the extent to 
which pervasiveness is a necessary feature of technology; that is, its penetration 
into all domains of human activity, not as an exogenous source of impact but as the 
fabric in which such activity is woven.  
 Information, computation and the computer revolution have reached philosophy 
departments as well. Terrell Ward Bynum, in 1998, published a groundbreaking 
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work entitled The Digital Phoenix: How Computers are Changing Philosophy. The 
preface indicates the extent to which, even at that time, the computer revolution had 
made its mark.  
From time to time, major movements occur in philosophy. These movements 
begin with a few simple, but very fertile, ideas — ideas that provide philosophers 
with a new prism through which to view philosophical issues. Gradually, 
philosophical methods and problems are refined and understood in terms of 
these new notions. As novel and interesting philosophical results are obtained, 
the movement grows into an intellectual wave that travels throughout the 
discipline. A new philosophical paradigm emerges. […] Computing provides 
philosophy with such a sweet of simple, but incredibly fertile notions—new and 
evolving subject matters, methods, and models for philosophical inquiry. 
Computing brings new opportunities and challenges to traditional philosophical 
activities. […] computing is changing the way philosophers understand 
foundational concepts in philosophy, such as mind, experience, reasoning, 
knowledge, truth, ethics and creativity. This trend in philosophical inquiry that 
incorporates computing in terms of a subject matter, a method, or a model has 




The arguments presented in the second part of this thesis, presented via David 
Foster Wallace’s masterpiece Infinite Jest, will work in this emerging tradition of 
digitization and computation. However, it will be a rather nuanced position as I 
promote what is otherwise a specialized and local discipline into a grand 
metaphysical world-picture, one in which the world is declared non-existent and the 
scattered, entangled worlds comprise sets of laws that enable its objects to perform 
particular roles. I will argue in favor of a world-picture in which, paradoxically, the 
world doesn't exist. Indeed, I'm emphatically not advocating an external-world 
skepticism wherein reality comprises our thoughts and the posits of those thoughts. 
                                                 
1  Ward Bynum and Moor, The Digital Phoenix: How Computers are Changing 
Philosophy (Blackwell 1998), pg. 1.  
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Such a view generally goes by idealism. The realism-idealism debate is hopelessly 
confused. This confusion results largely in virtue of a reductive metaphysical 
picture that restricts existence to one's preferred domain, say, perception, thought, 
or being physical or occupying space-time. Such a picture generates what I call 
‘coordinate confusion’. Much of philosophy could be rendered as the attempt to 
determine the proper coordinates for "queer" entities like numbers, sets, 
consciousness, fictional objects, and moral and ethical principles. The result is a 
spectrum of positions like eliminativism, naturalism, emergentism, idealism, 
epiphenomalism, etc. Depending on the starting point, the coordinates of those 
troublesome entities must be ascertained and the answer one gives to "coordinate 
confusion" more often than not functions as a philosopher's tell.  Realism is a local 
phenomenon. Idealism, for example, is a realism with regard to particular entities, 
whether ideas, the mind, perception, God, etc. There isn’t Realism simpliciter. All 
realism is about something or other. Thus, the simple split between 
realism/idealism operates under a profound confusion and yields only 
argumentation that operates on straw men.  
 Theories of totality and notions of the world currently presupposed by 
metaphysics will be our main target. This distinction, however, between our 
theories about the world and the world itself is precisely the metaphysics we should 
oppose. For, theories about the world are a way the world is. Hilary Putnam 
expressed this nicely: “the mind and world jointly make up the mind and world”2. 
This is precisely why it’s false to presuppose that we have, over here, the subject, 
                                                 
2 Hilary Putnam, Reason, Truth, History (Cambridge 1981), ix.  
 13 
res theoretica, and on the side of nature, over there, res extensa, that upon which 
we impose our theories of nature. Instead, theories about Nature are a way Nature 
is. Nature is inherently self-reflexive. This may, in fact, provide a nuanced revision 
of Parmenides’ cryptic remark: ‘thought and being are the same”.  
 The primary aim of philosophy is, by means of conceptual hacking, to overcome 
the dualism between thought and being. However, much contemporary philosopher 
fails to achieve a higher-order reflection that thematizes the thought of thought 
thinking the relation between thought and being. Most contemporary analytic 
philosophy, for example, operating under the assumption of scientific naturalism, 
assumes that given the fundamental truth of natural science, the relation between 
thought and being is quite clear. That is, physics investigates ‘the world’, 
understood as a blobject comprising spatio-temporal reality in which physical 
objects interact according to the physical laws of nature. This world becomes the 
object of a thought. Thought is understood as a physical calculation mechanism 
receiving physical inputs and generating complex semantic outputs. To know the 
thing in itself is to know how the world would appear without the existence of 
minds to whom the world appears. To appear to a human subject, the world would 
immediately evolve into something the content of which is unlike the features of 
which it’s composed.  
 The world is standardly taken to denote the totality of all spatio-temporally 
extended things governed by the laws of nature. It treats the world, in the words of 
Martin Heidegger, ontically; that is, the world is treated as a physical object. In 
modern philosophy the concept ‘being’ came to denote the physical world, the 
 14 
nature of which is investigated by the physical sciences. In this dichotomy, 
epistemology emerged as first philosophy and the being of the external world 
remained forever beyond the grasp of philosophical thought. If one were to take 
Quine’s criteria of identity and apply this principle to this conception of the world, 
then we should jettison such a simplistic notion. The criteria of identity states that 
in order to individuate something as being such and so one requires the possession 
of a criterion by means of which one can provide the sought-after individuation. 
The act of individuation seeks to delimit the entity in question, determining its 
boundaries and limits in order to distinguish it from other entities. Quine says, “no 
entity without identity”3. On such a conception, it’s difficult to see precisely how 
one could individuate the world with the result that the world remains the world. 
That is, “the world” would have to be an object of possible reference; it would in 
other words have to be a summum ens. But, the world is not a possible object of 
experience and therefore cannot be identified or individuated, for once its delimited 
it’s no longer the world. But, let’s not get ahead of ourselves. My argument against 
the world, and the argument in favor of metaphysical pluralism will occur in part 
two. Because I want to construe a metaphysical pluralism that’s digital, that is, a 
reality comprising discrete states, I’d like to venture through some history and 




                                                 
3 W.V.O. Quine, Ontological Relativity and Other Essays (Columbia University Press 
1969), pg. 23.  
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Form and Semantic Information 
 
The concept of information means many things to many people. Indeed, there are 
many different concepts of information afloat in the space of contemporary ideas, 
so the first thing one has to do when talking about information is to clarify what one 
is talking about. Below, I’ll sketch what I mean by ‘semantic information’ and its 
relation to the colloquial use of the word.  
 Despite the swarm of definitions, one common property of information in the 
stipulates that it has something to do with order and structure. In fact, the everyday, 
colloquial conception of information makes sense when we attend to its etymology. 
All the variants of ‘information’ —transformation, reformation, deformation, and 
conformation— pivot around ‘formation’ or ‘form’. Thus, information designates 
the infusion or transportation of form onto some previously unformed entity or 
entities. It is the shaping or our molding of a formless heap.  
 Throughout Western Philosophy we’ve seen various accounts of the nature of 
form and its appearance in the world. Plato, as is well known, introduced perhaps 
one of the first metaphysical systems into Western Civilization grounded precisely 
on the notion of form, or eidos. Plato paints a picture of a world in which every 
object and attribute is but a pale, imperfect copy of a perfect, abstract ideal, a form, 
or archetype, which resides somewhere in an imaginary heaven.  Aristotle, instead 
of rejecting outright Plato’s account of the forms, re-defined it as the set of the 
essential properties of a thing. An essential property, say, of a cat would be 
quadrupedialism, although color, being variable and consequently accidental, is not 
part of its form. Two cats share the essence of catness but there is no catness 
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without a real cat. Our understanding of the material world, he argues, depends not 
on having forms within our intellect. These mental forms he calls ideas, 
abstractions, or concepts.  
 Biology also utilizes this colloquial notion of information, where the infinity of 
shapes of living organisms provides us with a spectacle of awesome profligacy. In 
his book On Growth and Form, published in 1917, Scottish naturalist D’Arcy 
Thompson wrote,  
We have learned that our own study of organized form is but a portion of that 
wider Science of Form which deals with the forms assumed by matter under all 
aspects and conditions, and, in a still wider sense, with forms which are 
theoretically imaginable. The mathematical definition of a form has a quality 
of precision which is expressed in few words or in still briefer symbols and 
these words and symbols are so pregnant with meaning that thought itself is 
economized; we are brought by means of it in touch with Galileo’s aphorism 
(as old as Plato, as old as Pythagoras, as old perhaps as the wisdom of the 
Egyptians), that the Book of Nature is written in characters of Geometry
4
.  
The idea of form expresses relationships, and this insight carries over into the 
concept of information. It’s important to note, however, that information is not 
identical with form. The fractal patterns, for example, on the floor of a restaurant in 
Prague display various kinds of form, yet there’s no useful sense in which the 
pattern could be referred to as information. Cicero used the verb ‘inform’ to signify 
giving shape to something, forming an idea, and molding a person or his mind. 
                                                 
4 D’Arcy Thompson, On Growth and From (Cambridge University Press, 2014), pg. 269. 
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Information involves the transfer of form from one medium to another. Because 
form is about relations, we can tentatively define information as the communication 
of relationships.  
 Information should never be understood merely in its etymological sense. To 
do so yields an epistemological view of its nature, something we’re trying to avoid 
in this argument for a digital reality. However, should one render information 
etymologically, that is, in-forming a chaotic mess of mere data into a coherent unity 
—always thought to be accomplished by means of humans— then one cannot avoid 
adopting what I’ll call the Kantian View of Information. I call this the Kantian view 
because it advocates an essential relation between information and human-access. 
The correlation between reality and the human subject is rendered inescapable and 
subsequently leads to what’s been called ‘the worst argument in the world’ 
(TWAW)5. TWAW is the argument that any attempt to think the unthought ipso 
facto turns the unthought into a thought. Thus, it’s not possible to escape the 
“correlationist circle”. Kant’s Critical Philosophy retains as much power, influence, 
and pervasiveness today as ever, in all domains of intellectual work. You’ll find 
remnants of Kant in the Copenhagen Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics, various 
strands of Cognitive Science, and dare we say, with few exceptions, the dominant 
positions in contemporary philosophy.  
 The essential component of Kant’s Copernican Revolution is the following: the 
subject is conceived as an active agent whose conceptual constitution precludes 
                                                 
5 My knowledge of Stove’s ‘worst argument in the world’ came from the following 
article: James Franklin, “Stove’s Discovery of the Worst Argument in the World”, 
Philosophy 77 (4) (2002): 615-624.  
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unmediated and immediate experience of reality (the so-called ‘noumenal’ realm). 
The picture advocates a view in which the subject is always-already enmeshed in 
the process of observation. Observations operate on the basis of distinctions. These 
distinctions are the distinctions of the observer and not inherent to the environment 
or the reality under observation. Observations always have a blind spot, because 
during the process of observation the observation conditions cannot be 
observed simultaneously. I’m in favor of the constructivist thesis and, insofar as 
Kant is a constructivist, then we’re in fundamental agreement. However, there’s an 
important caveat: ‘observer’ designates not merely the active human, concept-
mongering subject but, rather, any constitutive system. For example, there’s a 
constructivist component to the relation between a plant and sunlight in 
photosynthesis, insofar as all possible relata in a particular situation are not 
incorporated into a plant’s activities. A plant doesn’t make much use, say, of the 
perfume someone just sprayed while admiring its (the plant’s) beauty. Rather, there 
exist in a situation particular systems of objects that are compatible with the 
functions of a more complex network. The complex process of photosynthesis, for 
example, involves strict rules governing the input-output functions that produce the 
wonderful dance of nature. The important point to stress is that ‘noumena’ and 
‘phenomena’ are not specific to human-world relations but, rather, a property of 
ALL relations. The human-world relation is simply one kind of object-object 
relation. The strategic and nuanced move here is to expand Kant’s Copernican 
Revolution to include all relations, not simply the human-world correlate. All 
relations produce or leave-behind a noumenal realm of properties that weren’t 
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compatible or were simply unimportant to the function of that particular activity. 
This is the concept of withdrawal.  
Slavoj Žižek nicely captures the choice late in his massive tome Less Than Nothing.  
Is the void of subjectivity a particular domain of the ‘universal incompleteness / 
void of reality, or is that incompleteness already in itself a mode of subjectivity, 
such that subjectivity is always already part of the Absolute, and reality is not even 
thinkable without subjectivity (as in Heidegger, where there is no Sein without Da-
sein as its locality)? It is a this precise point that Ray Brassier criticizes me for 
choosing the second, ‘transcendental’ option, unable as I am to think the Void of 
Being as such without subjectivity; from my standpoint, however, Brassier is here 
following Meillassoux, who pays a fateful price for his suspension of the 
transcendental dimension—the price of a regression to a ‘naïve’ ontology of 
spheres or levels in the style of Nicolai Hartmann: material reality, life, thought. 
This is a move which is to be avoided at all costs
6
.  
Contrary to Žižek, this is precisely the move I wish to make in what follows. Žižek 
makes the usual mistake of presuming that, for example, when observation is 
referred to in physics, especially in quantum mechanics, that human observation is 
under consideration.  
 This is wrong. I’m partial to at least one component of Graham Harman’s so-
called Object-Oriented approach for the simple reason that it takes seriously 
observation as a fundamental component of all interactions. Thus, when two objects 
interact and a simulation emerges in which one object subsumes certain compatible 
                                                 
6 Slavoj Žižek, Less Than Nothing: Hegel and the Shadow of Dialectical Materialism 
(Verso, 2012), pg. 905.  
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properties of its partner, an observation has occurred. Observation, as has often 
been repeated by quantum physicists trying to avoid the What the Bleep do you 
Know? shenanigans, should not be limited to a subjective activity accomplished by 
human beings. Rather, observation denotes the interpretive activity undergone by 
the informational exchange displayed by any relation of entities coming together in 
mutual matrimony. Any object can collapse the wave function; this privilege isn’t 
limited to the domain of human abilities. Object-Object relations, then, display their 
own subtle subjectivity insofar as any relationship does not exhaust the ‘objective’ 
properties of these respective objects. If there’s anything like objectivity operating 
here it’s the virtual multiplicity of possibles, each of which has certain probability 
distributions. These probability distributions refer to the becoming actual the virtual 
or more precisely, the probability of a state-of-affairs given the requisite structure-
generating observers. Alain Badiou also falls victim to the anthropic fallacy in both 
Being and Event and its phenomenological sequel Logics of Worlds insofar as The 
One, while not a primitive existent, is a property of human beings, that is, what 
grants consistency via set theory to the inconsistent multiplicity is human subjects.  
 Being withdrawals from all realities. Semantic information, to come back to 
the beginning of this section, underscores the representational or meaning aspects 
of information. I want to suggest that we expand semantic information to include all 
relations with the caveat that we adopt a metaphysical skepticism. All relations 
involve the construction of metaphysical caricatures. No relations can exhaust all 
the properties of respective relata. The interaction of sunlight and plants doesn’t 
exhaust all possible properties of sunlight and plants. There are leftovers so to 
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speak. These withdrawn, possible properties have something essential to do, I 
argue, with Being.  
 
 
Metaphysical, Shannon Information 
Hidden within the semantic notion of information is a syntactical or more profound 
metaphysical, structural notion of information. The technical definition of 
information is found in the work of Claude Shannon, particularly in his wonderful 
Mathematical Theory of Communication. Shannon disregards the semantic, 
representational properties in order to focus more precisely on its formal properties. 
I’m partial to this approach, which should be clear once we proceed into the second 
part. 
Shannon wrote at the beginning of his book,  
The fundamental problem of communication is that of reproducing at one point 
either exactly or approximately a message selected at another point. 
Frequently the messages have meaning; that is they refer to or are correlated 
according to some system with certain physical or conceptual entities. These 
semantic aspects of communication are irrelevant to the engineering problem. 
The significant aspect is that the actual message is one selected from a set of 
possible meanings. The systems must be designed to operate for each possible 
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selection, not just the one which will actually be chosen since this is unknown 
at the time of design
7
. 
Shannon, of course, doesn’t mean that information simpliciter has nothing 
whatsoever to do with semantics. For his purposes, however, meaning, reference, 
aboutness will not figure prominently as to be thematized in his theory. Shannon 
Information has less to do with individual messages and more to do with the totality 
of a situation or a state. Warren Weaver, who wrote the long preface to Shannon’s 
notoriously difficult book, claims: 
Information is a measure of one’s freedom of choice when one selects a 
message. If one is confronted with a very elementary situation where he has to 
choose one of two alternative messages, then it is arbitrarily said that the 
information, associated with this situation, is unity […] The concept of 
information applies not to the individual messages (as the concept of meaning 
would), but rather to the situation as a whole, the unit of information 
indicating in this situation one has an amount of freedom of choice, in 




As is known, the most basic unit of information is the bit (binary digit). A bit 
represents a choice between two possible states. So, a single bit (0,1) selected from 
a two-state space is said to carry information. In a more complex case, a message 
such as 0110010101 selected from a space of possible binary messages carries 
                                                 
7 Claude Shannon, The Mathematical Theory of Communication (University of Illinois 
Press, 1998), pg. 31.  
8 Ibid. pg. 9.  
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information in a similar way. What is important, for Shannon, is not any 
interpretation of these states; what matters is the specificity of a state within a space 
of different possibilities.  
Let’s formalize an information space.  
• An information space is defined as an abstract space comprising a number 
of states, information states, and a basic structure of difference relations 
between those states. 
A situation with 16 possible states has 4 bits of information. If information space 
refers to the totality of possible states in a given situation, then I could, at this very 
moment, make a fist; I could put some rap music on and wave my middle finger in 
the air; I could stick my thumb up. Each action is a possible state of my hand. 
Indeed, there’s countless others. These possible states and their discrete nature is 
information space.  ‘Information State’ refers to the actual arrangement of the 
space’s possibilia. Here, semantic information becomes important. An actualized 
possibility —a raised thumb for example— when entangled with other states yields 
very different consequences. For example, a raised thumb in response to the 
question “Was the movie enjoyable?” is different than a raised thumb when 
standing roadside with passing cars. The state-entanglement creates different 
senses. But these senses and states are discrete. More controversially, information 
states are worlds. As Wittgenstein wrote,  
The world is everything that is the case. The world is the totality of facts, not of 
things. The world is determined by the facts, not of things. For the totality of 
facts determines what is the case, and also whatever is not the case. The facts 
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in logical space are the world. The world divides into facts. Each item can be 
the case or not the case while everything else remains the same. What is the 
case —a fact— is the existence of states of affairs. A state of affairs (a state of 
things) is a combination of objects (things)
9
.  
 I won’t go into my reading of Wittgenstein here. Suffice it to say that it’s quite 
interesting that Wittgenstein’s early desire led him to seek study with Boltzmann, 
someone we’ll discuss below. This desire alas went unfulfilled as the latter took his 
life shortly before Wittgenstein’s arrival at the University in Vienna. But, notice the 
similarity to our hitherto discussion. Wittgenstein affirms a nuanced It from Bit 
thesis. What’s fundamental is facts or, in our language here, bits. The world is the 
collection of everything that is the case, viz. facts or bits. The important difference 
is that I pluralize Wittgenstein singular use of ‘world’. Worlds are everything that is 
the case. Worlds are collections of facts and bits. ‘Worlds’ here is synonymous with 
information states. An informational reading of Wittgenstein would be a fascinating 
study, indeed. Especially given Wittgenstein’s early forays into engineering.  
 What’s essential to take away from this discussion is the implicit metaphysical 
aspect of Shannon’s account of information. The difference between the bit-
components of an information space is Being. Every situation or assemblage is an 
information space. Cell Division is an information space; photosynthesis is an 
information space; the concentric rings in a tree trunk is an information space; my 
thought it’s snowing in Berlin is an information space; a performance of Thomas 
Adès’ Trevot is an information space, albeit an extraordinarily complex one; the 
                                                 
9 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico Philosophicus (Routledge Classics, 2001), pg. 
50.  
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physical universe is an information space, an even more extraordinary, exorbitantly 
complex one. As we’ll see later, however, there’s no Information Space. In other 
words, there’s no Information Space of all information spaces. This is another way 
of saying, more formally expressed, that universal quantification is impossible. 
Insofar as the metaphysical attitude involves what Bertrand Russell called “the 
attempt to conceive the world as a whole,” the argument is against metaphysics in 
this precise sense10. However, I’m not averse to all forms of metaphysics given that 
I’m not at the mercy of definitions, especially one as historically and semantically 
heterogeneous as ‘metaphysics’.  
 Let’s call the sentiment expressed by Russell —the grasping for the whole— 
Old-School Metaphysics. Old-School Metaphysics, as we’ll see more precisely 
later, designates the attempt to capture by means of thought and/or experiment a 
picture of the whole. It’s thus the epitome of a Weltbild. In contrast, New-School 
Metaphysics subtracts the quantification over Everything, and adds locality. The 
admittedly Hollywood-inspired slogan ‘The World Doesn’t Exist’ is the 
fundamental axiom of New-School Metaphysics11. We’re no longer concerned with 
cutting The Everything at the joints but rather concerned with the no-less ambitious 
attempt to identify the constitutive structure, laws, and Being of information spaces.  
 The difference between an information space and information state is crucial 
to understanding properly the metaphysical picture I’m going to paint below. I’ve 
already done some of the work above, but let’s concentrate on getting clearer before 
                                                 
10 Bertrand Russell Mysticism and Logic and Other Essays (Gutenberg Press, 1953), pg. 
1.  
11 This phrase is pilfered directly from the work of Markus Gabriel. See in particular his 
aptly titled Warum es die Welt nicht gibt (Ullstein 2013).  
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proceeding further. I’m not concerned directly with semantic information in what 
follows. Indeed, I’m not convinced that properties like meaning or reference or 
sense aren’t required in order to make my position intelligible. Because I want to 
argue for a structural realism, a position that defends the existence of mind-
independent structures, rules, facts, etc. I would argue in favor of the controversial 
position that meaning and sense would exist even in the absence of theoretical and 
practical concept-wielding bipeds. Because my interest here is philosophical, more 
specifically, the extent to which utilizing the conceptual resources of information 
theory can foster and lend credence to metaphysical pluralism, my focus will be 
primarily on Shannon and Boltzmann’s notion of Information. Boltzmann 
information was the measure of W, viz. the number of ways a system can be 
rearranged. The more astronomical W, of course, the more astronomical our 
ignorance. In simple two-state information spaces, like a coin-toss, our ignorance is 
reduced accordingly. The radicality of Boltzmann was his inclusion of absence in 
the definition of information. Whatever increased, Boltzmann reasoned, was the 
result of the arrangement of particles. In Vienna, his tombstone features his name, 
dates, and the following cryptic inscription: S =  k log W. This expression 
represents one of the most profound insights into the decryption of nature’s secrets. 
Boltzmann ushered into science a crucial understanding and utilization of 
probability, a notion that resided almost exclusively in his time in the domain of 
gambling! Instead of ascertaining the certitude of particular properties of particles 
—velocity, coordinates, mass, acceleration— Boltzmann underscored the 
likeliness, randomness and probability of the arrangement of particles. In place of 
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probability, however, one can talk of the number of ways to arrange an information 
space. Take a dice throw with six possible states. The probabilities are clear. But 
take, say, two dice. A two-dice-throw increases the complexity and number of 
possible states. Number of ways for ‘12’ is one; number of ways for the state ‘7’ is 
six. Entropy, under Planck’s direction, came to be understood as the logarithm of 
the number of ways of arranging the states of a system, multiplied by a constant in 
appropriate units. In fact, the mathematical notation written above (S= k log W) 
owes its formulation to Planck. ‘S’ refers to entropy (‘S’ distinguishes it from 
energy); ‘k’ for Konstante; and W for the number of ways of possible arrangement. 
My argument for the discrete nature of information spaces, and thus for reality, 
doesn’t imply that I see for philosophy the unenviable task of determining the 
entropy of each information space. I’m not aiming for predictions, certainty or 
measurement in philosophy. Rather, I’m seeking only a preliminary investigation 
into the metaphysical aspects of information theory and its possible application to 
various philosophical concepts. I hope to show that the utilization of its resources 
can propel forward and foster a metaphysical pluralism.  
 If anything information and entropy are about structures, relations, and states. 
It parallels then not an ontotheology in which metaphysics reduces various forms of 
complexity to the behavior of a particular kind of object. This is Old-School 
Metaphysics, reduction and monism of the worst kind. We should avoid substance-
based metaphysics at all costs. A Structural Realist commits to a mind-independent 
reality with the caveat that one’s ontology —one’s theory of existence— quantifies 
over all objects. Any ontology worth its salt must account for all objects, whether 
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physical or ideal, non-physical or real. Most brands realism avoid including 
structure, relations, and possibilia into their theory of existence; structural realism 
corrects this. It also takes as fundamental facts, bits, and states. All realities 
comprise structural and status (“states”) properties and, thus, Hegel may have been 
onto something when he claimed, “Spirit is a bone”. Structure is the skeletal frame 
of a system and to cut a system at its joints is to ascertain its structure, both 
underlying and emergent. If a child were to ask a structural realist, “So, Mr. SR. 
How does it all work?” the answer would be: every system is informational, and the 
systems have mind-independent structures and rules. Even its objects are clusters of 
data.  Perhaps more appropriate for the child: We live in computer simulations.  
  
On Being and Reality as Simulation 
Three American baseball umpires argue vehemently after a game about the calling 
of balls and strikes. The first exclaims that he "calls'em as I see'em"; the second 
insists he "calls them as they are"; the third argues that "they ain't nothin' until I 
call'em". This joke is a riff off an old tale John Archibald Wheeler used to repeat to 
one of his most famous students: Richard Feynman. Wheeler will serve as a hero or 
as the French prefer to say "master" of the general approach of this thesis. A student 
of Einstein and Bohr, two physicists who wisely eschewed the aversion to 
philosophical imagination, Wheeler adopted this proclivity toward Why, 
incorporated it into his scientific How. His philosophical concerns can be broken 
down into the following five questions: 
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• Why is there something rather than nothing? 
• Why the Quantum? 
• Participatory Universe? 
• What makes meaning? 
• It from Bit? 
 
Why something rather than nothing? will not be directly addressed here. I also 
won’t give an argument for why the quantum exists; rather I’ll presuppose it does 
and piggyback the applications of quantum theory to computing. This allows me to 
avoid a classically defined closed system with all its attendant demons: Descartes, 
Maxwell and Laplace in particular. I seek open, evolving dynamic systems whose 
fundamental constituents elude precise measurement and prediction. This isn't 
merely a heuristic model I seek; rather, this is the world I believe in and find out 
there. Not a closed System of the World but a transfinite proliferation of worlds or, 
more precisely, proliferating information states.  
 A participatory universe will be directly advocated. Like the third umpire 
mentioned in the joke above, there's nothing there -there are no states- until an 
observation occurs. This is of course a controversial position. It's been the 
playground of philosophy since its inception and since the emergence of quantum 
theory in the 20th century when Einstein wrote his famous papers against the 
seemingly anti-realist, probabilistic proclivities of quantum mechanics. However, 
it’s not only humans who participate. All objects, all relata, enter relations and 
generate/simulate information states/worlds.  
 30 
 We have expanded the role of observation to include all relations, not simply 
that of human-world correlate. All relations, whether subject-object or object-
object, involve observation insofar as "observation" designates a relation in which 
compatible information, physical or abstract, is communicated, processed and 
output. Hence, our computational worlds. All worlds are governed by this 
computational structure while not every world has the same computational 
functions. For example, the functions governing the communication and processing 
of information in the human brain are not the same functions governing those of 
human psychology. The rules for the social game played in the domain of American 
restaurants are not the same as the neurophysiological rules governing my bodily 
relation to nutritional input. For example, there's a rule in restaurant situations 
where your interlocutor offers to pay for the meal knowing this isn't a real offer. 
The exchange goes on for three rounds until someone gives up. This rule doesn't 
compare to the complex chemical and electrical exchange of information at the 
synaptic level. Another example: the rules governing the quantum, Planck level of 
physical reality differ completely from the classical rules of macroscopic physical 
reality. Despite stubborn attempts by physicists to reconcile these two exclusive 
domains of reality, their fundamental difference persists to such an extent that many 
have grown sufficiently courageous to abandon one or the other levels completely.  
 It from Bit will also play an important role in what follows. I will often 
interchange facts for bits arguing that, in fact, they are synonymous. This 
metaphysical picture departs radically from the common sense view that reality is 
some dumb, physical whatever out there. I proffer instead that the many realities in 
 31 
which we live, move, and have our being are constituted wholly and completely by 
information. As Wheeler wrote,  
Every it - every particle, every field, even the space-time continuum itself- 
derives its function, its meaning, its very existence entirely from the apparatus-
elicited answers to yes/no questions, binary choices, bits
12
.  
Wheeler, like Einstein before him, accomplished the seemingly impossible task of 
installing metaphysics and imagination back into physics. Wheeler brought the 
child back into serious, scientific discussion. He focused on questions that drive all 
of us to child-like reflection and wonder at the incredible complexity and sheer 
being of reality.  
 The further we pursue this string of associations the more explicit it emerges that 
reality, like the internet's distributive systems, comprises an interconnected web. 
Network of Networks. Relations are the object of philosophy and science. "The aim 
of science,” wrote Henri Poincaré,  “is not things in themselves, as the dogmatists 
in their simplicity imagine, but the relations between things; outside those relations 
there is no reality knowable"13.  
 The pure difference between primary bits I’ll call dedomena. These primary bits, 
however, are better to be regarded as qubits, that is, quantum bits, than as classical 
bits. Classical bits display a Boolean logic of information, as we've seen, with 
Yes/No, 1/0, On/Off, Open/Closed, High/Low Voltage. Qubits, however, in all 
their quantum glory, push thought to its limits by substituting "and" in place of 
                                                 
12 Wheeler, John A. (1990), W. Zurek, ed. Information, Physics, Quantum: The Search 
for Links, Complexity, Entropy, and the Physics of Information (Redwood City, 
California: Addison-Wesley).  
13 Henri Poincaré, Science and Hypothesis (Dover 1952), pg. xxiv.  
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"or". Now states can be both true and false at the same time: 1 and 0 at the same 
time, for example. It's easy to see why quantum computing has become the rage in 
debates in theoretical computer science. Quantum computers, while presented 
limited to solving astronomically large prime factor problems, perhaps hold the key 
to the next evolutionary stage of computation and its everyday ramifications for 
everyday life.  
 Dedomena is "data" in Greek. Again this refers not to the states but the 
difference between the states, before they become actual. Think of it as a pure 
logical space yet to be actualized into onto-logical space. Dedomena are 
emphatically not experienced directly but rather inferred information states. 
Dedomena for example consist as a kind of le Grand Dehors whose existence is 
required in order for anything at all to exist. For even if there's nothing, even 
presented with a white piece of paper or an empty set, we are still confronted with 
information. Even in the face of nothing, we have something, namely the fact of 
nothingness. I won't develop further this thesis here but consider this a path toward 
an answer to another of Wheeler's themes. Suffice it to say that I would advocate a 
position in which the foundational element of all worlds is non-material. Whether 
this spirals into idealism I leave open. In that case, both Norbert Wiener and John 
Wheeler are the worst of idealists. However I think not. Being comprises 
dedomena, patterns or fields of pure possibilia not matter or energy. Materiality and 
its attendant onticality are complex derivatives thereof. Alain Badiou mirrors such a 
view with his distinction between "inconsistent" and "consistent multiplicity"14. 
                                                 
14 Alain Badiou, Being and Event (Continuum 2006), pg. 30.  
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Inconsistent multiplicity can never be a possible object of experience, but only 
inferred through set-theoretical operations like the power set rule leading to the 
transfinite numbers.  
 A simulation is the actualized entanglement of information spaces. A world, 
then, is a simulation. Photosynthesis involves a number of informational entities —
plants, sunlight, sugars, carbon dioxide, oxygen, etc. But, as we’ve seen, this 
process doesn’t generate a simulation in which all possible properties come to 
reality. That’s why a simulation is an abstraction: it’s a simplified model. But, the 
simulation of a simplified model isn’t something specific to the relation of humans 
to reality. On the contrary. Any relation is a computational simulation and, thus, a 
world. For all worlds involved relations and constitutive rules. We live, therefore, 
in computational simulations. These simulations are as real as common sense’s 
reality! To be real is to be a simulation.  
 Absolute knowledge is the higher-order realization that no Royal Method exists. 
Indeed, there are methods. Darn good ones. But The One Method is an illusion. In 
other words, there's no all-encompassing algorithm the application of which 
decrypts the secret about reality. Methods illuminate new domains of speech and 
uncover truths and facts about the domains to which they're applied. But the dream 
of a mathesis universalis is an illusion. The non-existence of The Method renders a 
space in which speculation can take hold. That philosophical activity denounced by 
a figure no greater than Kant returns as the oppressed. A renewed metaphysics 
commences from the commitment to bits, facts and structures all of which exist to 
the same extent as neutrinos, cats, Pez dispensers and Teslas. As Dumbledore, 
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seemingly an advocate of a new metaphysics, exclaims: "Harry. Just because it 
happens in your mind doesn't mean it's now real".  
 Speculative Philosophy, in this sense, recuperates interest in the Absolute; 
however, it bumps the Absolute to a higher register. The Absolute is not longer a 
noumenal "great outdoors" of the collection of mind-independent macro-physical 
objects. The Absolute, rather, is the higher-order fact everything is contingent. The 
Absolute is the higher-order fact that every system teeters on the tangent of chaos.  
This is what Heidegger got right when he claimed that Being is not a being. Being 
is the difference that makes a difference. Being is the potentia inherent within 
information spaces. Being is the difference between yes/no, 1/0, on/off, and 
true/false. This is what Heidegger means when he accuses the sciences of not 
thinking. The near-sightedness of the natural sciences disallows a proper reflection 
on the enabling conditions of the ontic, viz. Being. This was precisely Heidegger's 
point in the opening of Being and Time. Heidegger won't play much a role here in 
virtue of his concern with the Sorge of Dasein. I depart from Heidegger's concerns 
precisely when he commences his interrogation of the human being as the proper 
medium to access Being. I'm concerned with Being and its collapse into actual 
information states, that is, into reality. Whether those states appear to a human or a 
tree isn't my concern.  
  Digital times need a digital philosophy. I propose we take seriously a position 
that advocates the fundamental discrete nature of our world. I will work out what 
this means in Part Two. The no-world thesis defended in the next section will apply 
most of the abstract ideas in this section to David Foster Wallace’s masterpiece, 
 35 
Infinite Jest. This application is justified for Wallace penned one of the most well 
versed information novels. He too advocated a discrete reality. That is, a reality 
comprising entangled states. These states do not flow continuously into each other 
but rather leap from world to world. A world is not an all-encompassing, closed 
aggregate of objects but rather an open network of entangled objects connected by 
virtue of algorithms. Each world comprises its respective organizing principles, 
aggregating and entangling compatible objects into unified information states. 
Worlds have limits and, at these limits, are fundamentally open. In the F. Scott 
Fitzgerald short story ‘My Lost City’, the protagonist ascends to the roof of the 
Empire State Building and immediately observes that NYC has limits. More 
precisely his city has limits. Fitzgerald writes,  
And with the awful realization that New York was a city after all and not a 
universe, the whole shining edifice that he had reared in his imagination came 
crashing to the ground
15
.  
We’ll see that worlds too have limits. Worlds are in pieces. Places and parts. More 
like cities and networks than we’ve ever thought.  
 For my purposes, the emergence of information culture doesn't represent simply 
a new organizing metaphor that digitally models and approximates an elusive 
reality. Reality is indeed elusive. But because reality always already recedes and 
eludes our simulations and models, relativism and anti-realism do not follow. I 
suggest we take seriously the view that reality itself is digital. The worlds in which 
we live are discrete simulations. We should view reality as constituted by 
                                                 
15 F. Scott Fitzgerald, My Lost City: Personal Essays, 1920-1940 (Cambridge University 
Press 2005), pg. 151. 
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information, that is, mind-independent, structural entities and worlds that are 
coherent clusters of dedomena. Information is not relative to a human observer but 
is relative to observation. Being as dedomena always withdrawals from any 
relation. Reality emerges from entangled information spaces. But Being itself 
always already withdrawals from a relation. But, again, relations engender 
simulations and these simulations are worlds. Computational worlds. The point is 
that you live in computational worlds whether you like it or not. You’re thrown into 
a proliferating numbers of worlds all of which operate according to particular 
logics, rules and algorithms. How do we understand a computational reality? 
Furthermore, how do we understand a messy computational reality, a radical 
metaphysical pluralism in which the One doesn’t exist. How do we understand a 
world in which there is no world? The continuation of philosophical inquiry 
without a confrontation with and employment of the tools of computation risks 
what I will call intellectual luddicism, that is, the philosopher who maintains that 
philosophy is ‘its own time rendered in thought’ but remains embarrassingly 








Theories of Everything and More: Infinity is not the End 
 
One very important interpretive key that can help readers understand and 
appreciate the complexity of Infinite Jest lies in the analysis of its recursive 
structures. Most of the novel’s constitutive narrative and  sub-narratives pivot 
around precisely this mechanism. Infinite Jest is about a film “Infinite Jest,” a film 
so entertaining that viewers cannot escape its paralysis-inducing pleasures. Viewers 
are sucked into an infinite loop of views until the regress concludes in the death of 
the viewer. One literally watches  the  film  to death. The recursive nature of the 
title is just the start of the endless jest of infinities! 
 This chapter will make explicit the implicit metaphysical position underlying 
David Foster Wallace’s infinitely complex second novel Infinite Jest. Furthermore, I 
will expand on the ideas presented in Part One. First, I will explore the 
fundamental dichotomy operative in contemporary philosophical debates in the 
wake of Kant’s Critical philosophy: the linguistic turn and the metaphysical turn. It’s 
quite common that readers of Wallace’s work place him within a certain 
Wittgenstein-inspired meta-philosophy, that is, the linguistic turn. I find this 
exclusivity mistaken and will provide a much-needed correction. In fact, Infinite 
Jest provides the seeds for the development of a quite radical metaphysical 
position that I’ll make explicit below. The section will conclude with what I’ll call 
a Doomsday Argument: the world does not exist. I’ll investigate the extent to 
which Wallace’s use of a Sierpinski Triangle as the “structural synecdoche” 
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underlying Infinite Jest contributes to such a prima facie absurd thesis as the 
non-existence of the world. Second, I will explore what I take to be Wallace’s 
preferred methodology, what I’ll call a phenomenology of worlds. As we saw in 
the previous section, ‘worlds’ and ‘information states’ will be used 
interchangeably.  
 I’ll distinguish Wallace’s objective phenomenology, which peers into the 
logical structure of worlds, from orthodox phenomenological investigation, which 
peers into the logical and transcendental structure of intentionality. Last, I will 
illustrate two types of infinity operative within Infinite Jest, viz. bad and good 
infinity. I will argue that Wallace’s theory of freedom evolves out of his notion of 
what constitutes the internal mechanisms of infinite sets. “Bad Infinity” comprises 
an incessant recursion in virtue of the activation of an algorithm, that is, an 
inconclusive, mechanical repetition. “Good Infinity,” on the contrary, consists in the 
higher-order reflection on the mechanisms or algorithms governing a particular set. 
By focusing on this higher-order reflection, we can illuminate Wallace’s view of 
human freedom. 
  
Metaphysics is dead. Long live metaphysics! 
 
The metaphysical turn represents a fundamental change of attitude in relation 
to the methodological power of the linguistic turn. It became au courant in 
philosophical circles, in the wake of Kant’s “Critical” philosophy, to restrict 
philosophical investigation to limning the structure of language, thought, and 
access-conditions to the world. The old Zen proverb captures this logic quite 
nicely: “when the finger points to the moon, the fool looks at the finger.” 
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Most of philosophy (or foolosophy?!), then, since Kant was indeed mainly 
because claims about reality were unwittingly taken as claims about our 
claims about the reality! In the introduction to The Linguistic Turn, Richard 
Rorty explains, 
 
The purpose of the present volume is to provide materials for reflection on the 
most recent philosophical revolution, that of linguistic philosophy. I shall mean  
by  “linguistic  philosophy”  the  view  that  philosophical problems are 
problems which may be solved (or dissolved) either by reforming language, 




Instead of investigating the fundamental nature of the world, such a conception regards 
the proper task of philosophical reflection as the analysis of our thought or talk about 
the world. Whether the philosopher investigates language, concepts, representations, 
or access-conditions to the world, she remains on the res cogitans side and 
implicitly presumably puts the world “over there,” ipso facto engendering the 
infamous gap between mind and world. The natural sciences, more specifically 
theoretical and experimental physics, investigate the fundamental nature of res 
extensa. If philosophy mingles at all with the latter, it is only indirectly in its proper 
custodial duties of cleaning up the conceptual and linguistic mess. This is an 
idealism about philosophy, that is, philosophy’s proper domain of activity consists in 
the investigation into the fundamental nature of res cogitans. At the very least, 
                                                 
16
 Richard Rorty (ed.), The Linguistic Turn: Recent Essays in Philosophical Method 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), 3. 
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“linguisticism” fails to thematize “the world” to render perspicuous its—the 
world’s—precise meaning. 
However, let’s not be misled by this meta-philosophical sleight-of-hand. 
Linguisticism operates according to its own ontology. It would be appropriate 
therefore to inquire into the ontology of language. Presumably, since the proper 
domain of philosophical investigation consists in the analysis of thought, 
concepts, and the logical structure of representation, that which is analyzed and 
investigated must exist! Thus, there’s an implicit ontology at play and focusing on 
language doesn’t get one off the hook ontologically or metaphysically. 
So that we don’t lose track, let me add again that the secondary literature on 
Wallace focuses almost exclusively on his inclusion and participation within the 
linguistic turn. Indeed, Wallace presents profound insights and explorations of 
representational solipsism, linguistic idealism, descriptivist accounts of language 
with strong parallels to ordinary language philosophy, strong interest in 
mathematical logic and arithmetical systems all of which seem to indicate that 
Wallace’s S.O.P. (standard operating procedure) consists in staging within the domain 
of fiction various problems within philosophy of language that have been a staple of 
philosophical thought since its inception. It’s difficult to give a succinct and fair 
overview of the linguistic turn here, but I think the preceding will suffice for my 
purposes. 
 Metaphysicians now generally storm the gates of the world right past the 
epistemological and linguistic protestors. They operate “from the gut,” as John 
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Heil calls it17 . That is, they seek “head-on confrontations with the universe.” 
Metaphysics has generally been defined as the investigation into the fundamental 
nature of reality. So, instead of bothering with our access- conditions to the world, 
metaphysicians find it perfectly within their rights to take literally their claims 
about the nature of the world. When someone says something about the nature of 
the moon, metaphysicians don’t take too seriously the idea that the claim about the 
nature of the moon was really a claim about the claim about the nature of the moon. 
Metaphysics, then, by making certain claims about the nature of the world already 
operates with an implicit ontology. Ontology, as far as this paper is concerned, 
consists in the higher- order explication of existence criteria. It—ontology—is not 
concerned directly with what there is, nor is it simply an investigation into the 
meaning of the concept ‘existence’. It’s concerned, rather, with making explicit the 
existence criteria with which we are always already operating. We make explicit 
our ontology après-coup insofar as, in order to make something explicit, it must 
already be operative in some implicit fashion. For example, when I claim, there is a 
prime number between 2 and 9 and this claim is true, then I’m committed to the 
existence of numbers. Our everyday acts —whether non- propositional or 
propositional— perform these ontological commitments. It would be strange indeed 
were we to live and move in the world without being at least implicitly committed to 
the existence of something! 
 I’ve referred to Wallace’s implicit position as a metaphysical pluralism. 
Metaphysical pluralism should be understood in contrast to its opposite, viz.  
                                                 
17 John Heil, The Universe as We Find It (Oxford University Press, 2012), pg. 1.  
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metaphysical  monism.  Pluralism liberates  our  concept  of  existence from the 
strictures of monism. Metaphysical monism is the view that there is only  one  
world or information state made of one kind of stuff. Metaphysical pluralism, on the 
contrary, advocates world plurality, that is, reality comprises a transfinite 
proliferation of information states. Monism conflates the world and reality and 
defines existence  in  terms  of  law-governed,  space–time  coordinates.  The 
ontology of metaphysical monism defines existence in terms of appearance within 
the world where the latter denotes the physical universe. I suggest we think differently. 
The physical universe is a world, not the world. The physical universe under 
investigation by the natural science is one, unified information state.  
  A world is a set of objects the collection of which is governed by the inclusion 
criteria of one’s ontology. Alexius Meinong’s “ghetto” notion of existence offended 
Bertrand Russell’s parsimonious sense of reality. However, Russell’s parsimonious 
sense of reality offends what I take to be Wallace’s promiscuous sense of reality. 
As we’ll see below, existence is always relative to a world. To be real is to be 
actual in the physical world. On this account, ‘Ghosts exist,’ is meaningless until 
one provides the proper information state in which ghosts exist. Ghosts do not exist 
in the actual information state of the physical universe. So, ‘Ghosts do not exist in 
physical reality’ is true. However, ‘Ghosts exist in Infinite Jest’ is true. ‘Ghosts exist 
in the original television series Scooby Doo, Where are You!’ is false given that the 
show’s fundamental premise is concerned  with  debunking  supernatural  
ontologies. 
 It’s very important not to confuse reality with existence or material existence 
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with existence. Ghosts exist despite not being real. Given that existence is relative to 
inclusion within an information state, ghosts exist in the domain of fictional 
characters without being real. To be real, then, is to exist in the actual, physical world. 
Ontology is the investigation into the implicit existence criteria according to which 
we’re always already operating, while metaphysics refers to the attempt to investigate 
the fundamental nature of that which appears in an information state or world. 
If existence is relative to a world, then we can go in two directions: we reduce 
the world to one particular information state, namely the information state of physical 
reality, or we proliferate our states and advocate a flat ontology, that is, a 
metaphysical pluralism in which an infinite number of worlds exist. A flat 
ontology is committed to the idea that all things equally exist, but all things do not 
exist equally
18
. What’s included within a world is established by the operative 
inclusion or existence criteria. So, when one claims that ‘existence is relative to an 
information state’ think of the inclusion of a particular object within a set the inclusion 
of which is set by inclusion or existence criteria. It follows, on such an account, that 
it is not always contradictory to claim that there are non-existent things. To assert, 
there is no coffee is not to employ an unrestricted quantifier that quantifies over 
everything in the world. One could assert there is no coffee while coffee 
nonetheless exists in the other room. I will not argue for this thesis here, even though 
it’s relevant to the discussion below, but this is why one can’t quantify over 
everything. That is, there are no unrestricted quantifiers. This is important because 
we’ll see below that Wallace implicitly defends what’s I’ve been calling a 
                                                 
18 I credit Ian Bogost with this formulation 
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metaphysical pluralism in Infinite Jest. In fact, his fiction is fundamentally concerned 
with the plurality of information states in which we find ourselves moving and 
existing. 
 In virtue of the fact that worlds can have sub-worlds—that is, worlds can exist 
in worlds—it’s important to recognize that worlds themselves exist. This is the 
fundamental point of the above critique of the linguistic turn. To restrict existence 
questions to the domain of language is a mistake insofar as one remains committed 
to the existence of language in order to analyze it. The linguistic turn operates 
with an implicit ontology and an implicit metaphysics. However, it places these 
the proper domain of philosophical investigation. Quine, for example, was concerned 
with something he called “ontological commitment.” What exists is always relative 
to what quantifies over our true theories of the world. That is, for Quine, to exist is “to 
be the value of a variable19 .” This formulation seeks to capture the ontological 
commitments of a theory already regimented in first-order, quantificational logic. I 
find Quine’s formulation persuasive on the condition that we modify his intentions.  
Instead of speaking  about  ontological  commitments,  it’s more fruitful to interpret 
Quine’s position as proffering a theory of existence überhaupt. And, as we said 
above, existence is relative to a world and, in the words of David Lewis, worlds 
“come and go with the pragmatic wind20”! Existence is not a first-order property of 
individual objects. Rather, it’s a higher-order relation. 
To summarize where we are. I’ve explored what I take to be the two dominate 
                                                 
19 W. V. Quine, From a Logical Point of View: Nine Logico-Philosophical Essays (Harvard: 
Harvard University Press, 1980), 13. 
20 David Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001), 164. 
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strands in contemporary philosophical discussion: the linguistic approach and the 
metaphysical approach. The linguistic turn advocates epistemology as first 
philosophy insofar as philosophy’s proper domain of investigation consists in the 
analysis of language, while the metaphysical turn bypasses the restrictions on talk 
about the world by doing just that, making claims about the nature of fundamental 
reality. I’ve suggested, moreover, that we modify the orthodox conception of 
metaphysics by avoiding its domain-reductionism and enable the proliferation of 
domains. Metaphysics, then, would receive a promiscuous makeover: metaphysics 
investigates the fundamental nature of those elements appearing in their respective 
domains. 
 
Doomsday argument: The world doesn’t exist 
Wallace’s metaphysical pluralism indirectly positions itself against any and all 
metaphysical positions that seek to reduce the complexity and multi- layered 
reality to one particular world. For Wallace, the world doesn’t exist. Instead of a 
bird’s-eye view of totality, we must remain mummified within our flesh. However, 
higher-order contemplation enables us to hop from skin to skin, information state to 
information state, world to world, thinking and tinkering with their constitutive 
laws. While the bird’s-eye view is jettisoned, Wallace permits what Max Tegmark 
calls a “frog’s view”.21 We’re not caged within one world but rather simultaneous 
occupants of many worlds the number of which seem to extend to the infinitesimally 
                                                 
21  Max Tegmark, “The Mathematical Universe”: http://arxiv.org/pdf/0704.0646.pdf, 
(accessed 24 September 2013).  
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small to the transfinitely large. This foreshadows Wallace’s notion of freedom, 
which we’ll address in section 3 below. 
Wallace has admitted in various contexts that he employed a Sierpinski Triangle 
as a structural model of Infinite Jest. The most informative elaboration of his 
employment of a Sierpinski Triangle can be found in his 1996 interview on KCRW’s 
show Bookworm. Wallace makes the following claim in response to host Michael 
Silverblatt’s intuition that Wallace employed a fractal geometry to structure the 
novel: 
That’s one of the things that’s structurally going on. It’s actually structured like 
something called a Sierpinski Gasket, which is a very primitive, kind of pyramidical 
fractal; although what was structured like a Sierpinski Gasket was the first draft 
that I delivered to Michael [Pietsch, Wallace’s Editor] in 1994 and it went 
through some mercy cuts. So, it’s probably kind of a lopsided Sierpinski Gasket 
now. But, it’s interesting, that’s one of the structural ways that it’s supposed to kind 
of come together’. And later: ‘It seems to me that so much of pre-millennial life in 
America consists of enormous amounts of what seem like discrete bits of information 
coming and that the real kind of intellectual adventure is finding ways to relate 
them into each other and to find larger patterns and meanings, which of course is 




Let’s pause to say a few words about fractals. To interpret Infinite Jest and 
Wallace’s intentions ontologically would be to attribute to him a fractal ontology. 
This discussion returns to the opening lines above with regard to the “interpretive 
key” to identifying what’s happening structurally in the novel, viz. recursive 
                                                 
22 One can access the interview at the following link. David Foster Wallace and Michael 
Silverblatt, “Infinite Jest Interview,” 
http://www.ckrw.com/etc/programs/bw/bw960411david_foster_wallace.  
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structures. Fractals are one kind of recursive structure, that is, they are geometrical, 
self-similar objects. For example, stories inside stories, Russian dolls, movies inside 
movies, or dreams within dreams. Think, for example, of Las Vegas’ replicas of 
famous cities: Paris, New York City, Venice (Italy). Imagine, though, if  builders  
constructed  in  Vegas  a  fully functioning model or Las Vegas! Vegas in Vegas. 
However, within the new Vegas, they also constructed a Vegas within Vegas within 
Vegas. This is an example of recursion. A fractal demonstrates recursive structure 
insofar as a basic pattern is iterated such that each individual part resembles the 
whole.  
 Indeed, we encounter a number of naturally occurring fractals in everyday 
life! Think, for example, of snowflakes, coral reefs, and nervous systems. We won’t 
explore this here, but there are non-fractal objects that are self-similar, viz. line-
segments. Note that an important difference exists between abstract and real 
fractals. The former’s iterative structure continues ad infinitum, while the latter’s 
doesn’t. At some point in the analysis of a natural fractal, the part does not resemble 
that whole. It’s not necessary to analyze in detail the intricacies of fractal geometry 
here; I do think the preceding definition and discussion will suffice however to 
follow the argumentation presented below. What is a Sierpinski Triangle? Let’s 
avoid the mathematical explanation, and focus more on what the triangle looks like 
and how it can be informally constructed. We’ll then speculate a bit on its 
ontological and metaphysical consequences. A Sierpinski Triangle is an elementary, 
pyramidical fractal. Its construction involves, first, drawing a triangle; then, within 
the triangle one draws three triangles and within those three triangles another three 
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triangles, and so on ad infinitum. The fractal nature of the triangle consists in its 







 The world is standardly taken to denote the totality of all spatiotemporally 
extended things governed by the physical laws of nature. It treats the world, in the 
words of Martin Heidegger, ontically; that is, the world is treated as an empirical 
object. The Sierpinski Triangle, one could say, exhibits this totality: everything that 
exists appears inside the triangle and inside the sub-triangles and sub-sub-triangles. 
How could one possibly argue for the non-existence of the world? Of course the 
world exists, one might object. Where else do we live than in the world? Fair 
enough. But, where is this world? We can’t have a possible experience of the world. 
One can’t point to the world. Indeed, one can point to various objects that appear 
within a world; however, the world itself can never be a possible object of 
experience.  
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 The physical universe, moreover, is not the world. If one posits that the world is 
the information state in which everything exists, it follows that, given the implicit 
existence criteria, in order to exist, the physical universe would have to appear 
within itself. This infinite regress illustrates the meaning behind the claim that 
only worlds exist. There is no domain of all domains, set of all sets, list of all lists 
or world of all worlds. 
 I’ve argued that we shouldn’t limit the world to law-governed, spatio- 
temporal coordinates. Rather, we should expand our notion of the world to a 
transfinite proliferation of domains in which things exist, appear and perform various 
roles depending on the nature and rules of that domain. Numbers do very different 
things depending on the nature of the domain in which they appear; hands perform 
distinct roles depending on the domain in which they appear. For example, it’s 
doubtless true that a hand is a collection of sub-atomic particles arranged hand-
wise; however, this doesn’t exhaust the true descriptions and properties of a hand. 
It’s important to note that I don’t want to conflate “horizons” or “perspectives” and 
what I’m calling worlds. Phenomenology would treat these different descriptions of 
a particular object as gestalt switches or changes of perspective. However, I want to 
claim that with what I’ll call an objective phenomenology and a metaphysical 
pluralism the worlds in which things exist and perform various roles exist. It 
amounts, then, to realism about information states. We do not project them onto the 
world; rather, they exist independently of our projective activity. Each individual 
triangle composing  a  Sierpinski  Triangle  represents a particular domain or world. 
Furthermore, the number of worlds can incessantly extend to the infinitesimally 
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small given that the triangles within triangles continue to proliferate ad infinitum. 
Thus, there is an infinite number of worlds. Most importantly, however, we began 
the triangular construction process by drawing a large triangle, subsequently 
engendering the “internal” infinite regress. But, we could also include this initial 
triangle within a much larger, more encompassing triangle, and could proceed 
outward into the transfinitely large. In other words, the regress extends inward as 
well as outward. 
 It’s important to note that when I claim that we occupy many worlds, I’m not 
claiming that our physical, spatiotemporal coordinates occupy two universes; that 
is, this position doesn’t necessarily imply the multiverse view currently gaining 
traction in contemporary physics (although I am partial to that position). Again, this 
is because the universe is not the world. The universe, rather, is a world. Think 
of a world as a domain of objects collected in accordance with axiomatic laws, 
rules and algorithms. Imagine a table on which you find some cubes. Suppose 
someone asks you, “How many objects are on the table?” Common sense may claim 
that there are three cubes on the table. However, suppose Max Tegmark emerges in 
the room and says to Common Sense Man, “Sorry. There aren’t three objects on 
the table. Rather, the precise amount is impossible to determine, as these cubes 
are merely subatomic particles arranged cube-wise.” Then, German painter Neo 
Rauch saunters into the room: “Given that the cubes are different colors. We’re 
forgetting to count the colors. So, in addition to the three common sense cubes, I 
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count seven different colors, giving me ten objects.23” 
 This example can be a bit misleading for my purposes, though. It can be used 
not to prove an ontological point, but to support the epistemological claim that the 
concept of existence is plural and, thus, we project different models of counting 
upon the world. I think this is wrong. I propose that we think of worlds as domains 
of objects collected according to some rules or laws, as existing independently of 
human projectile activities. That is, we find ourselves operating, living, acting, and 
thinking within structures whose nature exists independently of us. One needs to step 
away from the epistemological position toward the ontological.  
 Wallace employs precisely this model to compose his novel, the Sierpinski 
Triangle, takes this ontological step; that is, Infinite Jest explores proliferating 
domains and worlds and their constitutive laws. 
 
Objective phenomenology 
It is common knowledge that Wallace emerged out of an influential movement within 
post-WWII American fiction, viz. meta-fiction. Meta-fiction seeks to make 
explicit within traditional fictional narrative the normally merely implicit 
structures, mechanisms, and tropes that are the conditions for the possibility of 
fiction. Readers of meta-fiction encounter constant reminders throughout the text 
that what they’re reading is mediated by an Author whose particular narrative 
devices can service basic manipulative goals. In other words, meta-fiction sought 
the initially radical aim of exposing the degree to which reality and narrative are 
                                                 
23  For an elaboration of the cube example, see Hilary Putnam, Ethics of Ontology 
(Harvard University Press, 2004), pg. 33.  
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essentially and fundamentally mediated. Thus, narrative structure, language, and 
the Author of the story become essential characters of the story. Wallace 
developed his fictional interests within this tradition; however, he later found its 
incessant self- referentiality empty and its use of irony, which had emerged as a 
form of radical social critique, had been co-opted by the-powers-that-be. It had, 
as a result, lost all its radical potential insofar as its self-referential moves 
exhibited all the solipsistic proclivities Wallace grew to abhor. In fact, he 
struggled most of his post-Infinite Jest career to develop a viable alternative to the 
empty formalism of post-modern meta-fiction and succeeded, I think, in performing 
what I call a moral meta-fiction. The methodology of a moral meta-fiction is what 
the title of this section of the chapter calls “objective phenomenology.” 
 Phenomenology consists in the investigation into the nature and logical structure 
of human intentionality, and what appears within this intentional structure—that is, 
our conscious acts are always about something in particular. I can think, fear, or 
desire particular empirical or abstract objects, think about states of affairs in the 
world, etc. Mental acts and states, that is intentionality, though, must be directed at 
something; they must be about something. Thus, phenomenology pivots around this 
investigation into the logical structure of intentionality and ipso facto there emerge 
philosophical problems of “inside”/“outside.” That is, how do I get from in here to out 
there? It’s not difficult to see where meta-fiction pilfered many of its conceptual 
tools. Out of phenomenology emerge many of the perennial philosophical problems. 
For example, consider the problem of the relation of thought and reality, related of 
course to the discussions above concerning the linguistic and metaphysical turns as 
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well as being a central concern of Wallace’s work. How much of the structure of the 
world and its constituents is a projection of the conceptual and linguistic structure of 
human beings? Furthermore, how can we even know where our projection begins and 
ends? 
 Don Gately, a central character in Infinite Jest, tells an interesting joke during 
an AA (Alcoholics Anonymous) meeting. This joke functions as an important analogy 
to a fundamental problem operative within Wallace’s fiction. Two fish are swimming 
along when they encounter another fish, who/which asks them, “Morning Boys! 
How’s the water?!” Once the fish achieves a sufficient distance from them, one of 
the two fish asks the other, “What in the hell is water?” Among other things, the 
joke illuminates the fact that human conceptual calisthenics has infiltrated and 
permeated reality to such an extent that the “real intellectual adventure” consists in 
demarcating where precisely, or even approximately, reality begins and conceptual 
thought ends. But, one must first escape the cave of first-order ignorance in order to 
achieve the higher-order reflection on the water/world—“Morning Boys! How’s the 
world?” Objective phenomenology asks precisely this question. 
 Objective phenomenology operates a bit differently from orthodox 
phenomenology. It —objective phenomenology— investigates the logical 
structure of information states in general. So, while phenomenology thematizes the 
structure of intentionality, that is, the aboutness of human mental states,  objective  
phenomenology  thematizes the logical structure of the many worlds in which 
humans appear and engage in activities of various sorts. As we’ve seen we live and 
move and have our being in what seems to be an infinitely complex number of 
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worlds: there’s the information state of Language, Society, Government, Fiction, 
Physical Reality, State Fairs, Lobster Festivals, Math and Logic Classes, 
Relationships, University Life, Digital Worlds, Art Museums, Dentist Offices, 
Bathrooms, Libraries, etc. While of course each particular world is describable 
within the language of the natural sciences, most particularly and successfully in 
theoretical and experimental physics, it’s not the case that the mathematical language 
of contemporary physics exhausts the complexities and rules of these respective 
worlds. For example, while the physics of color or the physical laws governing 
fluid dynamics doubtless explicate many of the complexities composing a Jackson 
Pollock painting, other equally as important elements of the painting slip through 
the clutches of physics’ mathematical language. It would be strange indeed if 
MOMA replaced all their museum guides with physicists from NYU since the 
meaning of a painting is not exhausted by its inclusion or appearance within one 
particular domain, viz. the domain of physics or the domain of art museums. 
Paintings can appear in what seems like an infinite number of domains, and, most 
importantly, these domains comprise rules, laws, expectations, norms, etc. that are 
not mere projections of human creatures. Instead, the human finds himself 
participating in domains the laws of which are already there and function, if you 
will, as the riverbed through and in which our actions flow. 
 To get a better feel for this argumentation, let me provide something like a 
analogical compass, which should make it clearer what I’m getting at. Take, as an 
example, Duchamp’s so-called “ready-mades.24 ” Most art critics conceive of 
                                                 
24 Let it not go unacknowledged that, in Hilary Putnam’s definition of metaphysical 
realism, he defines realism as the commitment to a “ready- made” world. That is, a world 
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Duchamp’s aesthetic motivation as something like a democratic gesture; that is, 
any particular object, regardless of its status, can be an object of art. However, I 
think this epistemological interpretation misses a crucial ontological feature of 
Duchamp’s radicality. Here’s what I mean. Duchamp’s “ready-mades” are everyday 
objects placed within a particular physical space, an art museum, and the apparent 
radicality of Duchamp’s Gesture, placing a toilet within an art museum, seems to 
concern the object itself; that is, anything can be a piece of art. I think this is 
only partly true. A more interesting thesis is the following: the true radicality of 
Duchamp’s Gesture consists in the toilet’s placement within an art museum 
drawing attention to the information state in which the toilet appears. What counts 
as “art” or what’s included or excluded from the halls of an art museum is governed 
by stringent inclusion conditions, viz. an ontology. Duchamp’s reflexive move 
makes explicit the constitutive rules governing the inclusion criteria within the 
space of an art museum. More importantly, his radical gesture makes explicit the 
contingency of any and all constitutive rules governing such a space. Duchamp’s 
Gesture is ontological insofar as it calls attention to an information state in which 
things exist and appear and perform various functions given that space’s constitutive 
rules. It’s not merely the boring, epistemological insight that we all have different 
views of the same object. 
 Objective phenomenology then is a logics of worlds. Here we see that 
objective phenomenology also has an “inside/outside” problematic of its own. 
                                                                                                                                                 
already constituted in such and so a manner. The task of philosophical investigation 
consists in identifying the one true regimented discourse that adequately ascertains this 




Instead of it being a problem of consciousness, however, it’s more a problem of, 
say, configuration spaces or domains. “Configuration space” refers to the abstract 
space represented in experimental and theoretical physics. Simply stated, and 
indeed, not doing justice to its complexity, it goes something like this: in order to 
study a particular real event that occurs in the universe, the physicist represents the 
real time event within a mathematical model or structure that isolates certain 
variables, the configuration of the system. The experiment seeks to decrease the 
number of influences operating on the event at the time in question. In order to 
measure and determine the facts of the event, this configuration space is 
represented by mathematical models. Suppose one develops a massive model to 
represent a particular state of affairs in the universe. Let’s say that model 
represents the physical universe at war. Now, suppose one uses a tennis court to 
model a real-time event in the fictional war in question. What if it starts snowing?! 
Does it snow on the model? Or does it snow in reality? Wallace explores this 
wonderful example in the famous “Eschaton” event in Infinite Jest (321–42)25. But, 
while configuration spaces and configurations are, of course, human inventions, 
highly successful ones at that, we should nonetheless not shy away from 
advocating their reality. That is, they exist. In fact, to my mind, theories and models 
about reality, given that they exist, are a way reality is. This echoes themes explored 
in Part One. A configuration space in theoretical physics is nothing more than the 
general category I identified as a simulation. The theoretical or experimental 
physicists relates to a number of different technologies and, out of this relation, 
                                                 
25 I’ll refer to page number of Infinite Jest in parentheses. Quotes are taken from David 
Foster Wallace, Infinite Jest (Little Brown, 1996).  
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emerges a simulation. This simulation is a world/information state. Again, as we 
saw in Part One, humans don’t have a monopoly on simulations. All relations, all 
worlds, and all information states are simulations.  
 It’s important to note that Infinite Jest begins with Hal Incandenza, arguably 
the novel’s main character, a tennis and intellectual prodigy who also develops a 
circular drug addiction, telling the Reader, “I am in here”. He goes on to describe in 
detail the simulation in which he’s “in,” the (academic) context, the room, the 
expectations, etc. composing the situation as such. The end of the novel, by contrast, 
concludes “out there,” presumably reflecting Don Gately’s—who’s a former drug 
addict who plays an essential role in the novel’s exploration of Alcoholics 
Anonymous communities— escape from the cycle of Demerol addiction. 
 Wallace’s fiction attempts to present and explore incomplete fictional 
worlds —kinds of locally structured worlds of inexhaustible reality— the 
completion of which requires the participation of his readers. The completion process 
is outsourced to his readers who, lost within an informational overload, seek to be 
reflectively at home in a world. Most of Wallace’s work, I believe, can be placed 
within the ancient tradition of spiritual exercises, where the goal of physics, 
poetry, and philosophy was to enable those who embark on the life of 
understanding to achieve a harmonious and reflective existence within the complex 
infinities of space and time. However, in the ancient tradition, the preferred means 
of reflection on the secrets of nature and the infinite complexity constitutive of the 
world consisted in thought’s cosmic exile from the physical strictures of mortal 
life. Hence, in almost all ancient traditions, we read of exiles into the heavens 
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where, stationed away from the riff-raff of everyday life, one can contemplate in a 
state of purity the wonders of the world and its peculiar occupants, human beings. 
Wallace prevents cosmic escapades into contemplative heaven by preventing a 
bird’s- eye view of the whole, or what Thomas Nagel called the view from 
nowhere
26
. How to combine the perspective of a particular person inside the world 
with an objective view of that same world, the person and his viewpoint included? 
How is it possible to develop a theory of totality when one’s position of 
enunciation is within that totality? Human thought cannot achieve a position from 
which the whole and its constituent parts and interrelations gradually develop into 
a high-definition picture of reality. Wallace keeps us moored within a world, or 
within a domain, in all their labyrinthine complexity, stitching together what 
seem to be patterns and interrelations without the psychological or ontological 
release of definitive answers. Whether those patterns are really there and 
constitutive of reality, or whether those patterns are simply projections of a 1,360-
gram meat machine, serves as a fundamental aporia within Wallace’s fiction, and 
kind of, say, metaphysical skepticism. 
 
                                                 
26 See Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989). 
Nagel dubs this “a problem that faces every creature with the impulse and capacity to 
transcend its particular point of view and  to conceive of the world as a whole.” Nagel 
thinks that an objective view cannot include everything and will always be incomplete. 
“Reality,” Nagel asserts, “is not just objective reality.” For Nagel, objectivity is not a 
property of things. Rather, objectivity consists in an attitude toward things. That is, the 
manner of understanding things and their relations such that one seeks to describe any 
kind of experience or thought “from the outside,” and include it in a wider account of 
things in which that experience or thought occupies no privileged position. Nagel claims, 
if I’m reading him correctly, that some things remain unaccounted for within an objective 
account: some things will have been left out within the account. Debussy once said of 
Maeterlinck that he had a “passion for the beyond,” a kind of “synoptic ambition.” 
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Wallace’s big TOE 
The exploration of an author’s contemporary reality and its seemingly herculean, 
interconnected patterns, and the attempt to capture and represent these underlying 
patterns in some kind of fictional intuition constitutes one of the aims of a form of 
literary fiction, viz. theory of everything (TOE) or encyclopedic fiction. At 1,079 
pages, 97 of which comprise 388 footnotes, Infinite Jest fits snugly into this 
tradition alongside the sprawling novels of his heroes —Thomas Pynchon’s 
Gravity’s Rainbow, William Gaddis’s The Recognitions, and JR, James Joyce’s 
Ulysses and Finnegans Wake— but not without the following caveat: where most 
TOE novels explore the effect and possibility of the mythological and 
metaphysical impulse of totalization, Infinite Jest, while being a TOE, shows the 
impossibility of TOEs. TOE novels are expansive in reach and seek to capture 
reality’s infinite complexity within a particular model. Unlike most encyclopedic 
novels, Wallace enacts a fictional critique of the metaphysics of totality, what we 
above called “domain reductionism.” Metaphysics can be understood in this sense as 
a reaching for a conception of totality. 
 According to Kant, the nature of human reason consists in its desire to propel 
itself out of a finite situatedness toward the “idea of absolute totality.” In short, 
Infinite Jest shows its readers that the world doesn’t exist; rather, reality comprises 
a transfinite proliferation of worlds. Worlds are infinitely complex and 
transfinitely proliferating. But there are certain dangers implicit within infinity and 
infinite regresses, dangers that were certainly not alien to Wallace. In fact, he 
consistently explored the concept of infinity both in his non-fiction and his fiction. 
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Below, we’ll explore two types of infinity, “bad” and “good” infinity, operative 
within Wallace’s Infinite Jest. 
 
Good and bad infinity: Morning Boys! How’s the world? 
I would like to connect metaphysical pluralism to a couple of themes that 
occupied Wallace’s work perhaps more than any other: solipsism and human 
freedom. The aforementioned  infinite  loops,  recursions,  and  addictions in 
Infinite Jest chronicle the degree to which excessive data-gathering, addiction, 
annular fusion technology, and athletic training lead to a dizzying circularity 
from which there appears to be no escape. However, Wallace offers liberation 
from the vortex of circularity. I want to suggest that, in Wallace’s work, 
liberation from “bad” infinite regresses consists in the higher-order act of 
choosing what one does and doesn’t pay attention to within the operative 
domains in which we’re participating27. We can be robotically manipulated by 
the rules and laws of whatever world we find ourselves in; or, we can tarry with 
                                                 
27 In an important passage early in Infinite Jest, tennis coach Schtitt introduces a recursive 
tennis strategy that takes advantage of Georg Cantor’s set-theoretical “paradise.” The 
narrator claims that “Schtitt, whose knowledge of formal math is probably about 
equivalent to that of a Taiwanese kindergartner, nevertheless seemed to know what 
Hopman and van der Meer and Bollettieri seemed not to know: that locating beauty and 
art and magic and improvement and keys to excellence and victory in the prolix flux of 
match play is not a fractal matter of reducing chaos to pater. Seemed intuitively to sense 
that it was a matter not of reduction at all, but—perversely—of expansion, the aleatory 
flutter of uncontrolled, metastatic growth—each well-shot ball admitting of n possible 
responses, n2 possible response to those responses, and on into what Incandenza would 
articulate to anyone who shared both his backgrounds as a Cantorian continuum of 
infinites of possible move and response, Cantorian and beautiful because infoliating, 
contained this diagnate infinity of infinities of choice and execution, mathematically 
uncontrolled but humanly contained bounded by the talent and imagination of self and 
opponent, bent in on itself by the containing boundaries of skill and imagination that 
brought one player finally down, that kept both from winning, that made it, finally a 
game, these boundaries of self ” (IJ, 82). 
 
 61 
the infinite complexity by breaking the cyclical loop of infinite regresses and self-
referentiality by means of higher- order detachment from the world that frees us 
so that we can thematize its structures and laws. These “bad” infinities are 
represented in the aforementioned loops, recursions, addictions, mechanical 
training, and circular themes littered throughout Infinite Jest. 
 The film “Infinite Jest” propels viewers into a regressive feedback loop of 
incessant viewing until the viewer simply dies. This is the revolving door of 
solipsism. However, there’s another Infinite Jest, namely the novel itself, which 
represents a “good” infinity, an outward expansion beyond mechanical repetition. 
Moreover, answers to fundamental questions of the novel take place outside the 
temporal boundaries of the novel and force the Reader to enter the space of reasons 
and connect the dots. Wallace’s moral meta-fiction absorbs the Reader not into his 
(Wallace’s) own consciousness in order to alert the Reader to the fact and structure 
of subjective or authorial mediation; rather, while remaining within the orbit of 
meta-fiction, Wallace sublimates its narcissism and all-encompassing repetitive 
vortex of signifiers, into a moral meta-fiction, one concerned with inviting the 
Reader into particular domains not of his (the author’s) making. Once the Reader 
inhabits a particular world, Wallace issues an imperative, “Pay attention!” or 
“Look around! See the extra-ordinariness and infinite complexity of the ordinary 
and finite.” In this sense Wallace embodies a nuanced version of Socrates, not 
because he engages discursively with interlocutors to discover the logoi of 
concepts and definitions, but rather the logoi of what Wittgenstein called “forms of 
life.” 
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 Wallace’s ontology was a regional ontology. Yet, within the regional were both 
an infinitesimal depth and a transfinite breadth. He invited you, the Reader, into 
domains already constituted in such and so a manner, and begged you to pay 
attention to their abyssal complexity. In his now famous commencement address to 
the Kenyon College graduates in 2005, now titled This Is Water, Wallace explored 
this idea. He reminds the audience repeatedly that the goal of any education worthy 
of the name “isn’t really about the capacity to think, but rather about the choice of 
what to think about”; “that education can reveal a (properly) Copernican revolution 
in which humans, immediate experience to the contrary, are not the center of the 
universe. The opposite view, that we are the center of the universe and existence, 
is our default setting, hardwired into our boards at birth. Think about it: There is 
no experience you’ve had that you were not at the absolute center of.” He goes on to 
underscore the difficulty involved in avoiding lapsing into solipsism, that is, the 
tendency to attribute everything to a function of one’s projectile cognition: “it is 
extremely difficult to stay alert and attentive instead of getting hypnotized by the 
constant monologue inside your head” 28 . Education, then, consists in teaching 
students that learning how to think “really means learning how to exercise some 
control over how and what you think. It means being conscious and aware 
enough to choose what you pay attention to and to choose how you construct 
meaning from experience. Because if you cannot or will not exercise this kind of 
choice in adult life, you will be totally hosed . . . how to keep from going through 
your comfortable, prosperous, respectable adult life dead, unconscious, a slave to 
                                                 
28 Wallace, This Is Water: Some Thoughts, Delivered on a Significant Occasion, about 
Living a Compassionate Life (New York: Little, Brown, & Co., 2009), 41. 
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your head and to your natural default setting of being uniquely, completely, 
imperially alone, day in and day out”29. He later claims, “But, if you’ve really 
learned how to think, how to pay attention, then you will know you have other 
options. It will actually be within your power to experience a crowded, hot, 
slow, consumer-hell-type situation as not only meaningful, but sacred, on fire with 
the same force that lit the stars—compassion, love, the subsurface unity of all 
things”30. 
 Wallace’s use of Ludwig Wittgenstein concerns not merely the focus on 
“meaning as use” or the construction and analysis of logical space. Rather, this 
passages show that he takes seriously the idea of showing versus saying. To speak 
or say what’s wonderful spoils the wonder; Wallace can only invite you and gesture 
toward the infinite complexity of the domains he explores. He sometimes seems to 
function as a philosophical tour guide of the various domains he chose to explore. 
 Philosophy and fiction, for Wallace, appear to be therapeutic activities; 
however, not because, as Wittgenstein thought, i t  cures  the  hubris and 
gullibility of human reason to mistake linguistic and grammatical complexities for 
metaphysical entities. On the contrary, philosophy and fiction can provide the 
“kick” to propel the person into a reflexive relation to  his  or  her  default  
settings,  both  epistemological  and  ontological,  in order that the worlds and 
situations in which we find ourselves, and their constitutive rules and laws, are 
thematized and made an object of reflection. Most importantly, higher-order 
reflection on the structure and laws of domains exposes the contingency of those 
                                                 
29 Ibid. 47.  
30 Ibid. 
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constitutive rules. Philosophy and fiction can illuminate the contingency of the 
formal structures and laws governing all domains. This is precisely what makes 
philosophy and fiction so radical. 
 Perhaps it’s a stretch, but I think it’s at least interesting to think of 
Wallace’s implicit metaphysics as “quantum,” that is, a kind of quantum fiction. 
As contemporary theoretical physicists improve and develop the standard model, 
we’re seeing radical alternatives emerging concerning what’s most constitutive of 
physical reality. Some propose that the most fundamental reality is not in fact 
particles or individuals things; rather, the most fundamental level of reality is 
intangible: fields, relations, or waves. I’m proposing that we extend this quantum 
logic to domains in the sense defined above. Both the “manifest” and “scientific” 
images posit individual things, whether macroscopic or microscopic respectively, 
as the most fundamental constituents of reality. However, some avant-garde views 
posit fields or waves in which individual objects appear. However, these fields 
aren’t in any sense of the word things. Likewise, what is most fundamental 
metaphysically, on the account sketched above, are not the individual objects that 
appear in domains but rather the domains themselves. 
 Worlds comprise interdependent individuals interfacing according to evolving 
rules and laws whose governance function as the rails along which society moves. 
The most fundamental components are not the elements, the individuals, nor the 
particles; rather, the worlds, fields, relations, networks, etc. in which they appear 
and perform are what’s most fundamental in the many worlds of Wallace’s fiction. 
It’s important again to stress that worlds are not empirical objects. Physicists like 
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to think of the physical universe as an empirical object, most recently as a wave-
function. However, worlds on this conception are no things, they are no-thing 
perhaps “less than nothing.” To conclude with the conclusion of the film Now You 
See Me, Wallace could have said this to you as well: “Come in close. Closer. 
Now you know the secret . . . on the count of three open your eyes and tell me 





An excursion through Infinite Jest has allowed us to glimpse what it means when 
we forfeit belief in the fictitious notion of the world. In its place a dynamic, creative 
reality emerges, one in which we’re limited to local simulations each of which 
functions according to regional laws. The laws, as I’ve understood them, are 
computational insofar as they take inputs and generate outputs. Whether human-
object relations or object-objects relations, the relata of reality are incessantly 
entangling and generating world simulations comprising information. If one were to 
look askew at reality, achieving sufficient distance from local entanglements, 
reality one could venture looks like a Kandinsky painting: overlapping shapes of 
different sizes and complexity, none of which stand firm as fundament. While 
cliché the oft-used metaphor of Russian dolls seems apt. One never reaches bottom 
simpliciter. Rather, one is tossed and turned through a vertiginous search for a 
proper Heimat concluding in a realization that the Absolute is nothing more than 
the simulation itself. That reality is a contingent simulation subject to evolving, 
dynamic information states is the Absolute. There is a reality/appearance distinction 
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maintained in this position. Old School Metaphysics, as we’ve seen above, 
maintains a commitment to the really real beneath the illusory plasticity of 
empirical reality. New School Metaphysics, however, sustains a reality/appearance 
distinction but introduces a real that’s elusively slipping from relations.  
 Our place in the world is, indeed, one of actors on the stage of information 
states. Human freedom consists not in the freedom to do what one will; human 
freedom designates the higher-order recognition of one role specific to a particular 
state and the ability to hack this state and elicit and entangle and short-circuit one’s 
position. Humans, like all entities, are engineers and hackers. Homo hackus.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
